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ABSTRACT
This paper uses an unusual pay reform to test the responsiveness of investment in schooling to changes
in redistribution schemes that increase the rate of return to education. We exploit an episode where
different Israeli kibbutzim shifted from equal sharing to productivity-based wages in different years
and find that students in kibbutzim that reformed earlier invested more in education. This effect is
stronger for males and is mainly driven by students whose parents have lower levels of education.
Our findings support the prediction that education is highly responsive to changes in the redistribution



















In this paper, we study the effect of changing the redistributive policy on the 
educational choices of Israeli teenagers. In particular, we examine a unique episode 
where some kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz) changed their decades-long policy of setting 
wages independent of an individual’s human capital to setting wages to reflect the market 
rate of return. This sharp change in the redistribution policy from equal sharing to pay-
for-productivity introduced a dramatic increase in the returns to schooling for kibbutz 
members. We rely on this sharp change to test whether and to what extent this policy 
change induced high school students to invest more in their education, as reflected by 
their academic achievements.  
This paper contributes to two strands of the literature. From a public economics 
perspective, this paper sheds light on the extent to which redistribution policy influences 
long run labor supply, as mediated through educational choices. While it is well known 
that changes in taxes affect labor supply decisions in the short run,
1 as pointed out by 
Saez, Slemrod and Giertz (2009), much less is known about how such changes affect 
labor supply decisions in the long run, because it is difficult to identify empirically how 
such tax changes will affect educational choices. This paper fills this gap by studying 
how responsive are educational choices to tax changes fills this gap. 
From labor economics perspective, economic models of optimal human capital 
investment (Ben Porath 1967, Becker 1967) suggest that the level of investment in 
schooling is expected to increase in the perceived rate of return to education. The basic 
premise is that future labor market returns in the form of earnings are a main motivation 
for investment in schooling, and the higher are these market rates of return the higher is 
the optimal level of investment. However, despite its centrality in modern labor 
economics, this fundamental assumption has hardly been tested empirically, both because 
variation across individuals in the rate of return to schooling is rarely observed and 
                                                 
1 See also Chetty et al. (forthcoming) on how the effects of taxes on labor supply are shaped by interactions 
between adjustment costs for workers and hours of work constraints set by firms. 2 
 
because sharp changes in this return rarely occur.
2 Our paper informs us about the 
responsiveness of investment in schooling to changes in returns. 
We use administrative records collected by the Israeli Ministry of Education for 
six consecutive cohorts (from 1995 to 2000) of 10
th grade students, following them to 
graduation. The data contain detailed demographic information on each student as well as 
his home address. We use the latter to determine who lives in a kibbutz and when a 
student’s kibbutz implemented the pay reform. A main outcome of interest we examine is 
students’ achievement in the matriculation exams at the end of high school. Passing all 
the matriculation exams successfully and getting a matriculation diploma (equivalent to a 
baccalaureate diploma in most of the European countries) is a major milestone in 
education in Israel as it is the ticket to post-secondary schooling; it yields a substantial 
earning premium in the general Israeli labor market. Other outcomes of interest are 
whether the student graduated high school, the average score in the matriculation exams, 
and whether her diploma meets the university entrance requirements. 
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the pay reform was not 
implemented in all kibbutzim in the same year. We use a difference-in-differences 
approach, illustrated in Figure 1, comparing educational outcomes of high school students 
in kibbutzim that reformed early (the “treatment group”) and late (the “control group”), 
before and after the early reforms (but before the late reforms). We show evidence that 
students in the treatment and control groups are nearly identical in all observable 
background characteristics on which we have information, such as parental schooling and 
number of siblings, as well as very similar in all their pre-reform schooling outcomes.  
Specifically, as our first difference, we compare students in kibbutzim that 
reformed early (1998-2000) with students in kibbutzim that reformed late (2003-2004). 
As our second difference, we compare students who were affected by the early pay 
reforms (were in high school after the early reform but before the late reform began) with 
students who were unaffected by the early reforms (were in high school before the early 
reforms). The difference in this difference between kibbutzim that reformed early vs. late 
                                                 
2 There is, however, literature on the relationship between the recent skill-biased technological change and 
the rise in wage inequality in the US (e.g. Autor, Katz and Krueger 1999, Card and DiNardo 2002). On the 
long term trends in inequality and the returns to education, see Goldin and Katz (2008).  3 
 
can be interpreted as the causal effect of the reform, under the assumption that in the 
absence of the reform, the change in achievements would not have been systematically 
different in treatment and control groups. 
We find that students in kibbutzim that reformed early increased their investment 
in education as reflected by their educational outcomes. The mean score in the 
matriculation exam (Bagrut) increased by 3.55 points relative to a pre-reform mean of 
70.6, or by 0.17 standard deviations of the test score distribution. The matriculation rate 
increased by 4.9 percentage points, and the university qualified Bagrut rate increased by 
6.0 percentage points, which is almost 12 percent of the pre-reform university qualified 
Bagrut rate in the control group. The pay reform even increased the high school 
completion rate by a significant 3.3 percentage points, from a baseline that was already 
over 95 percent for the pre-reform cohorts. We further show that the effect is larger for 
students in kibbutzim that reformed to a larger degree. To translate our coefficients into 
semi elasticities,
3 we calculate that the pay reform increased the return to a year of 
schooling for the average student by about 7 percentage points. Our estimates thus imply 
that a 1 percentage point increase in the returns to a year of schooling increases 
graduation rates by 0.43 (3/7) percent, improves the proportion of students graduating 
with a university qualified matriculation by 1.7 percent (12/7) and improves mean exam 
scores by 0.51 points (3.55/7). 
This positive effect of the reform on education outcomes is mainly driven by 
students whose parents have lower levels of education. This finding is consistent with the 
idea that the utility is concave in income, making a future dollar increase in earnings 
more valuable for students who expect to end up in the low tail of the income 
distribution; thus students from weaker background are more likely to increase their 
investment in education. This finding is opposite to that of a recent cleanly-identified 
paper by Jensen (2010), which found in the context of an experiment in the Dominican 
Republic that students with more educated parents respond more to changes in the 
perceived returns to schooling. One possible explanation for Jensen’s findings is that 
                                                 
3 We feel more comfortable to report results in terms of semi elasticities rather than elasticities because the 
pre-reform returns were close to zero, making an elasticity measure highly sensitive to exact pre-reform 
return.  4 
 
parental schooling often proxies for family wealth, and richer people are less financially 
constrained when making education choices. In our context, however, this channel plays 
a lesser role both because parents’ pay pre-reform was unlinked to education and 
productivity and because the less educated parents in the kibbutz are on average more 
educated than the more educated parents in the Dominican republic. The difference we 
find is more likely to reflect inherent differences between people from different 
educational background in the responsiveness to the change in the returns to schooling 
brought by the reforms. For example, more educated parents may be more likely to 
convey to their children that education is important in itself. It could also be that the more 
educated parents reduced their time inputs in their children’s education, because their 
value of time increased sharply following the reform (an inherent consequence of any 
change in redistribution policy), which offset the positive incentive effect of the pay 
reform.  
Furthermore, unlike other papers that find that females tend to be more responsive 
to changes in schooling incentives (e.g. Schultz 2004, Angrist and Lavy 2009), we find a 
larger effect for males. This difference likely stems from the fact that, unlike other 
studies, we study a pay reform that affects future earnings, not a program that directly 
rewards high performance in school. Females could be less responsive if, for example, 
they expect to be the secondary earner in their household, meaning they expect their 
human capital to contribute less to the overall household income. Indeed, we show using 
labor force surveys that females are less likely to be in the labor force and more likely to 
sort into low-wage occupations. This finding also contributes to our understanding of 
how the labor supply response to taxation differs by gender. While the literature suggests 
that women’s labor supply is more responsive than men’s to changes in income taxes (see 
for example, Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis, 2007) our finding suggests that men’s 
investment in human capital could be more responsive than women’s. 
Finally, we exploit the variation in the intensity of the pay reform. Specifically, 
some kibbutzim introduced a full pay reform and moved directly to a pay system that 
reflected market forces. Other kibbutzim initially introduced only a partial pay reform 
that was partly based on market forces, but which also included a wide safety net for 
members with the lowest earnings potential. Many partially reformed kibbutzim 5 
 
eventually fully reformed, and many did so during our period of study. We find that the 
effect of the pay reform was the largest for students who lived in a fully reformed kibbutz 
throughout their three years of high school. These results further strengthen the causal 
interpretation of the evidence since there is very little selection bias that could explain the 
difference in the effect of the pay reform by its intensity.  This “intensity of treatment” 
effect is shown again to be larger for students whose parents have lower levels of 
education, and larger for males. 
The identifying assumption in our empirical strategy is that the exact year in 
which a kibbutz reformed is unrelated to the potential outcomes of its high school 
students. This assumption implies that older cohorts of early- and late-reforming 
kibbutzim should have had similar high school outcomes on average, which we indeed 
find to be the case. We use two additional tests to support our identification strategy. 
First, we show that there were no pre-reform differences between treatment and control 
kibbutzim in time trends of educational matriculation outcomes. Second, high exit rates 
during high school that are differential between treatment and control kibbutzim could be 
a threat to identification if, for example, students who leave experience a decline in their 
academic performance because they need to adjust to their new high school, or if their 
parents moved in order for them to attend a different school. We show that exit rates were 
low and unrelated to the implementation of the pay reform.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a short 
review of the existing literature that is most closely related to our paper. Section III 
presents a brief background of kibbutzim and the pay reform, and of the Israeli high 
school system, and also describes the data. Section IV discusses the empirical framework 
and identification strategy. Section V presents the estimation results, section VI puts into 
perspective the magnitudes of the effects, and section VII concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Despite an important body of theoretical literature, the empirical literature that 
tests the relationship between the rate of return to education and investment in schooling 
is relatively small. Freeman (1976) studied changes in college enrollments in the US and 
found that they were responsive to changes in rates of return to schooling. Kane (1994) 6 
 
finds evidence that whites’ college enrollment rates in the 1980’s in the US were 
responsive to the increase in returns to education, as measured by the ratio of college 
graduates’ to high school graduates’ mean earnings (the college premium). For blacks, 
however, there is little evidence of such a relationship. This conclusion is based on the 
trends in enrollment rates not being different by gender for blacks even though there were 
large gender differences in the trend in the college earnings differential. However, Kane 
(1994) also reports that students seem to be more responsive to increases in direct costs 
than they are to the present value of future earnings differentials. However, as noted by 
the author, the limitation of these findings is that they are primarily based on a 
coincidence of time series, namely the similar timing of a rise in returns to education and 
a rise in college entry. Therefore a causal interpretation of the association between returns 
and college enrollment is not possible in this case.    
Several studies estimate the perceived rate of return to schooling, as distinct from 
the actual rate of return estimated in this paper, and some then assess its effect on 
schooling. Betts (1996) and Smith and Powell (1990) have attempted to estimate the 
perceived returns among high school and college students. The latter study finds that 
students accurately estimate the earnings of college educated workers; however, men on 
average expect their own earnings to be above the mean for such workers, a finding the 
authors attribute to an optimism bias in perceived ability. Dominitz and Manski (1996) 
approach the measurement of perceived returns directly by asking high school and 
college students to estimate what their future earnings would be in hypothetical situations 
of different levels of education. They find that men accurately estimate the earnings of 
other men with different levels of education, while women tend to overestimate the 
earnings of other women. Avery and Kane (2004) also ask about own expected earnings 
in assessing the perceived returns to college education among high school students in the 
Boston area. They find that students overestimate the returns to education. Jensen (2010) 
uses survey data from the Dominican Republic and reports the opposite findings. 
Specifically, students under-predict their returns to education, and students who were 
better informed (experimentally) of the higher estimated returns were significantly less 
likely to drop out of school in subsequent years. A related study, Jensen (2011), examines 
whether investments in girls in India respond to changes in their future employment 7 
 
opportunities. The experiment provided three years of recruiting services to help young 
women in randomly selected rural Indian villages get jobs in the business process 
outsourcing industry. The results suggest that girls in treatment villages were more likely 
to be in school, and that parents responded to the increased future labor market 
opportunities for their daughters. Attanasio and Kaufman (2009) analyzes the link 
between people's “subjective” expectations of returns to schooling and their decision to 
invest into schooling based on data from a household survey on Mexican junior and 
senior high school graduates that elicits their own and their parents' beliefs about future 
earnings for different scenarios of highest schooling degree. The results suggest that 
college attendance decisions depend on expected returns to college. Millett and Oster 
(2011) also demonstrate that school enrollment decisions respond to future market 
prospects. They find that introducing new Information Technology Enabled Services 
(ITES) centers in India causes a 4% to 7% increase in the number of children enrolled in 
primary school and suggest these impacts are due to changes in returns to schooling, and 
not due to income resulting from the ITES centers. 
Other somewhat related research explores the relationship between the business 
cycle and investment in schooling. Specifically, Sakellaris and Spilimbergo (2000) focus 
on foreign students coming to US universities and find that for OECD countries 
enrollment is countercyclical, whereas it is pro-cyclical for non-OECD countries. 
Our paper is also related to a literature on the achievements of high school 
students in kibbutzim relative to students in cities. This literature focuses on the pre-
reform period. Trumper (1997) compares samples of kibbutz and city students and finds 
that, while in junior high school (grades 8 and 9), city students were better achievers than 
kibbutz students, this difference became insignificant in senior high school (grades 10 
and 11). Gilboa (2004) uses data from psychometric test results during the period 1992-
1996 and compares achievements of kibbutz and city children. He finds no differences in 
the average grade of children whose parents have more than 12 years of schooling. 





III. Background and Data 
a. The pay reform and the rate of return to schooling in kibbutzim 
i. Brief description of kibbutzim and the nature of the pay reform 
Kibbutzim are voluntary communities that have provided their members with a 
high degree of income equality for almost a century.
4 Traditionally, all kibbutzim were 
based on full income sharing between members. Specifically, each member of a kibbutz 
was paid an equal wage, regardless of her contribution to the community. Kibbutz 
members who worked outside their kibbutz brought their salaries in, and these were split 
equally among members. This meant that monetary returns to ability and effort were 
close to zero. Specifically, there were no earnings-related returns to schooling in the 
kibbutz, as members earned the same regardless of their education levels.
5  
The episode that we study is a unique pay reform that kibbutzim in Israel adopted 
beginning in 1998. During the following years, many kibbutzim shifted from equal 
sharing by introducing compensation schemes based on members’ productivity, which 
created a link between productivity and earnings in kibbutzim for the first time. These 
pay reforms were a response to changing external pressures and circumstances facing 
kibbutzim. Some contributing factors were a decline in world prices of agricultural 
goods, bad financial management, and a high-tech boom during the mid-1990s, which 
increased members’ outside options considerably. But perhaps the biggest problem was 
that many kibbutzim had borrowed heavily in the 1980s, both to expand their housing 
stock and to expand their industry. In the early 1980s, it was easy and cheap for 
kibbutzim to borrow money because inflation in Israel was very high and loans were 
often not indexed to inflation. However, the Israeli government eventually decided to 
take action to halt the inflation and, as part of the stabilization program, raised interest 
rates dramatically. Kibbutzim, like many other businesses in Israel, found themselves 
with huge debts they could not repay. Eventually, some of the loans were erased and 
                                                 
4 For a history of kibbutzim, see Near (1992, 1997). For an overview of the economics of kibbutzim, see 
Abramitzky (2011). 
5 Kibbutz scholars and observers have often felt, as predicted by economic theory, that under the traditional 
kibbutz system, kibbutz-raised children often lacked ambition and a sense of personal achievement. 
Bettelheim (1969) concluded that “they will not be leaders or philosophers, will not achieve anything in 
science or art.” This quote was also cited in Gavron (2000). 
  9 
 
others were rescheduled, but living standards in many kibbutzim still fell substantially, 
many members left during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and talk about a major reform 
of kibbutz life began.  
In reformed kibbutzim, members’ wages reflected market wages so that members 
were allowed to keep a substantial fraction of their earnings for themselves.
 For members 
who worked outside their kibbutzim (about a fourth of all members), market wages were 
the wages they received from their employers (prior to the reform, these wages were 
brought by members to their kibbutz and were split equally among all members). For 
members who worked inside, market wages were based on the wages of non-kibbutz 
workers of similar occupation, education, skills, and experience. A kibbutz ‘tax’ was 
deducted from members’ gross wages to guarantee older members and very low wage 
earners in the kibbutz a safety net (i.e. a minimum wage). We note that throughout the 
period we study, students made free educational choices.  
 
ii. How the reform changed the return to schooling 
The pay reform was essentially a sharp decrease in the income tax rate. Before the 
reform, income in kibbutzim was 100% taxed. Post reform, the tax rates in kibbutzim 
became more similar to the Israeli tax rates. Specifically, kibbutz members faced a 
progressive tax system, with marginal tax rates ranging from 20 to 50%.   
To gain a sense of how big the reform was in terms of an increase in the return to 
education, note that pre-reform the monetary return to education was zero and post 
reform the return to education became similar to the rest of Israel, which is estimated by 
various studies at about 8% per year of schooling. In actuality, while the reform resulted 
in a big increase in the return to schooling, it likely increased the return to education by 
less than this amount for several reasons. First, monetary rewards are not the only reason 
people acquire education.
6 Indeed, members of kibbutzim have never been uneducated 
even before the pay reform, despite the absence of monetary returns to schooling. Non-
monetary incentives such as prestige and care about the collective had always played a 
role in the pre-reform period. It could also be that before the reform, factors such as peer 
                                                 
6 See Oreopoulus and Salvanes (2009) for a recent paper that makes this point convincingly.  10 
 
pressure and collective bargaining affected members’ education decisions. We note that 
such factors that increase the pre-reform return to education are inherent to highly 
redistributive policies. We also note that they cause us to overstate the size of the increase 
in return to schooling, and thus underestimate the estimated elasticities with respect to 
changes in return to schooling.  
Second, the exit option meant that the return to education was higher than zero pre 
reform, and some members might have acquired education to improve their wages upon 
exit.
7 If a high school student knew for sure that he was going to leave in the future, his 
perceived return to schooling was high even pre reform, and the pay reform did not 
change his perceived return to schooling. On the other hand, a high school student who 
planned on staying faced no monetary returns to schooling and the full pay reform 
increased his return by 8 percentage points. For an average high school student who had 
not yet decided whether to stay, the reform increased the perceived returns by less than 
the full 8%, or about 6.4%.
8 Third, for kibbutzim that only reformed partially, the post 
reform returns are smaller, so that their pay reform increased the returns by a lower 
amount.  
To illustrate how the reform increased returns to schooling, we collected data on 
the earnings and education of all working members in one particular kibbutz that is 
currently reforming its pay system from equal sharing to a full pay reform. Figure 2 (and 
the underlying Online Appendix Table A1) illustrates that while before the reform 
members of all education levels earned the same wage, post reform more educated 
members earned higher wages in this kibbutz. In addition, we collected data on post 
reform wages of all working members in another fully reformed kibbutz (one of our 
                                                 
7 As noted, a kibbutz-born individual could always choose to leave her kibbutz and earn the market rate of 
return on her education outside. At the same time, a range of mechanisms was in place to limit the 
attractiveness of this option (for example, bequests were not allowed, and members could not take their 
share of the assets of the kibbutz with them). Note that Israel is a small country, meaning the outside 
market return to education was the same for members of all kibbutzim, specifically both in kibbutzim that 
reformed early and later. Moreover, we show in a later section that exit rates during the period we study 
were relatively low and nearly identical in kibbutzim that reformed early and late. 
8 To gain a sense of the increase in return for such an average student, we note that in the decade prior to 
the reform, about 20% of members left their kibbutz, implying that the perceived return for such a student 
pre reform was 1.6% so that the reform increased their perceived returns by 6.4%. To see this, assume a 
high school student that plan to exit the kibbutz in the future with probability 20%. The pre-reform returns 
for such student is 0.2*(ReturnOutside)+0.8*(ReturnInside)=0.2(ReturnOutside)+0.8*0=0.2*8%=1.6%. 
That is, the pay reform increases the return to schooling for such student by 6.4%.  11 
 
treatment kibbutzim). Pooling observations from these two fully reformed kibbutzim, 
Table 1 illustrates the large returns to schooling after the pay reform. Specifically, we run 
a regression of ln(wages) post reform on education level, with and without controlling for 
a member’s age and age squared. A bachelor degree is associated with 35% increase in 
wage relative to high school education (exp(0.3)-1). A master degree is associated with a 
57% premium, and doctoral degree with a 88% premium. Stating these different degrees 
in terms of years of schooling, we find that an extra year of schooling is associated with 
8% higher wages, which is the same as the returns outside of kibbutzim. This finding is 
consistent with Klinov and Palgi (2006), who found similar returns to education for 
kibbutz members and city residents using survey data from 2004 (Labor Force Survey) 
and 2005 (kibbutzim survey
9). 
 
iii. Why compare kibbutzim that reformed in different years 
Kibbutzim that even today are based on equal sharing and never reformed differ 
from those that did in that they had very different experiences in the decade leading to the 
reform period (Abramitzky 2008). Specifically, kibbutzim that reformed experienced a 
deeper financial crisis and higher exit rates in the decade leading to the reform. 
Kibbutzim that did not reform are therefore not a good comparison group for those that 
did.  
Kibbutzim that implemented the same pay reform a few years apart from each 
other are more likely similar to each other. While it is difficult to know exactly why some 
kibbutzim reformed in 1998 and others in 2003, this likely reflects differences in the 
degree of internal opposition to the reform by the objecting minority (often older 
members) in the kibbutz, and is unlikely to be related to the outcomes we study in this 
paper.
10 Indeed, we later show that students in kibbutzim that reformed earlier were 
                                                 
9 This is a Survey of Public Opinion in kibbutzim to estimate Mincerian wage equations for a sample of 
wage earners in Israeli cities and for a sample of kibbutz members. The survey was conducted in 2005 by 
Michal Palgi and Eliat Orchan of the Institute for Research of the Kibbutz at Haifa University. 
10 Since the pay reform was such a fundamental change in the key defining principle of kibbutzim, 
implementing it in a kibbutz required the overwhelming support of a large majority of the kibbutz’s 
members. This was not an easy process, because such a reform was against the original ideology of the 
kibbutz and many members, especially the older cohorts, had lived their entire lives under full equal 
sharing and strenuously resisted the change. Older members were also potentially the biggest losers from 
linking salaries to productivity because they no longer worked, but had supported the earlier generation by 12 
 
practically indistinguishable from those in kibbutzim that reformed later in both their 
background characteristics and their pre-reform educational outcomes.  
 
iv. How salient was the reform 
Evidence suggests the move from equal sharing to differential pay signaled 
strongly to young adults in the kibbutzim an increase in the financial rewards to human 
capital. First, this pay reform was a dramatic change in the returns to skill. Whereas 
before the reform wages were equal for all members of a kibbutz, the reform introduced 
huge productivity-related wage differences within a kibbutz for the first time. This 
increase in the return to skills was noticeable within a family, as students’ parents 
experienced a decrease or increase in their earnings depending on their skills (Figure 2 
and Appendix Table A1 illustrate this point).  This change was also noticeable in 
kibbutzim as a whole. A survey of 3000 kibbutz members conducted by Pilat institute in 
2004 reveals huge wage differences by occupation and education. For example, a director 
of a kibbutz sector (e.g. agriculture sector or industry sector) started to earn close to 
30,000 New Israeli Shekels (NIS) (about $8000 per month), and members in leading 
positions such as the main secretary (chairman) and the treasurer of the kibbutz earned 
over 15,000 NIS (about $4000). Over 80% of members holding such positions have 
academic degrees. In contrast, a member working as a menial laborer in the kitchen or in 
the laundry, none of whom had a post high school academic education, earned less than 
4,000 NIS (about $1000). A more recent survey in 2009 that included 180 kibbutzim that 
reformed their pay structure reveals large pay gaps within kibbutzim. The survey looked 
only within kibbutzim; it provided data on the monthly wages of 120 different 
occupations. The highest gross monthly income recorded in the survey was 17,500 NIS 
($4,600) and the lowest 4,100 NIS ($1,080). This range suggests large income inequality, 
                                                                                                                                                   
working during the previous decades of equal sharing. Some members even took their kibbutz to court, 
claiming that a shift from equal sharing meant reneging on the original contract they had entered with their 
kibbutzim years earlier. Younger members were the ones typically leading the reform. They claimed that 
times had changed and a reform that linked salaries to productivity was necessary for the kibbutzim to 
remain viable communities. The eventual reforms almost always protected older members who didn’t work 
by providing them with a safety net. 13 
 
which is most likely much higher once the wages of the members employed outside the 
kibbutz are taken into account.
11        
Second, the pay reform was highly noticeable by members. The pay reforms in 
kibbutzim have been the most discussed topic in kibbutzim since the reforms started. The 
new productivity-based sharing rules were hotly debated and voted on by members in 
kibbutzim. Booklets elaborating on the reforms were distributed to all members. There 
were even some cases of kibbutz members suing their kibbutz because of the pay reform. 
The pay reform also received a lot of attention in the media both in Israel and abroad. 
Naturally, high school students in kibbutzim observed the heated discussions over the pay 
reform and saw their parents’ wages increase or decrease substantially depending on their 
education and skills. Thus they must have been aware both that their kibbutz had 
instituted a pay reform and of its practical implications.  
We note that even though people in kibbutzim grew up in communities where the 
link between schooling and earnings was essentially non-existent, they were in a very 
good position to understand their post-reform rates of return to schooling. Kibbutzim are 
typically located close to cities, kibbutz-born children interact with non-members in their 
high schools, they very often have family outside of the kibbutz, and in general, unlike 
American communes, kibbutzim are not isolated from the Israeli society as a whole and 
they are well aware of their outside options (Abramitzky 2011). Moreover, with the 
implementation of the reforms, kibbutz members received detailed information about the 
new sharing rule and how earnings were now going to be linked to productivity and 
reflect market forces.  
Finally, we note that no kibbutz that reformed moved back to equal sharing. 
Looking ahead, kibbutzim that reformed are very unlikely to ever go back to equal 
sharing, meaning high school students were reacting to a permanent change in their 




                                                 
11 This information is provided in the daily newspaper Haaretz article in 17/09/2009.  
[www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/objects/pages/PrintArticle.jhtml?itemNo=1115205] 14 
 
v. Did late reformers observe early reformers and anticipate they would reform too 
While the pay reform was implemented starting at a particular date and created a 
sharp change in the wage structure, we cannot rule out that members in kibbutzim that 
reformed later observed the reforms in other kibbutzim, and anticipated that at some later 
date their kibbutz would reform too. However, three relevant things are worth noting. 
First, conceptually, we note that even if anticipation effects were present, such effects 
make it more difficult for us to find an impact of the reform, because it would imply that 
students in the control group too perceived some possible increase in the returns to 
education and increased their investment in schooling accordingly. Second, this is one 
reason we choose as a control group kibbutzim that reformed at least four years after the 
treatment kibbutzim reformed, making such anticipation effects less likely and less 
prominent if they exist. Third, empirically, we do not find evidence for such an effect, in 
the sense that educational outcomes in control kibbutzim are similar for the earlier and 
later cohorts. 
 
b. The Israeli high school system 
Israeli high school students are enrolled either in an academic track leading to a 
matriculation certificate (Bagrut) or in an alternative track leading only to a high school 
diploma. The Bagrut is completed by passing a series of national exams in core and 
elective subjects taken by the students between 10
th  and 12
th grade. Thus, Bagrut 
certificates are typically obtained at the end of senior year (twelfth grade) or later. 
Students choose to be tested at various proficiency levels, with each test awarding 
one to five credit units per subject, depending on difficulty. Some subjects are mandatory 
and many must be taken for at least three units. Advanced level subjects are those 
subjects taken at a level of four or five credit units. A minimum of 20 credit units is 
required to qualify for a Bagrut certificate, though some university study programs 
require more, and students must also satisfy distribution requirements. About 52 percent 
of all high school seniors received a matriculation certificate in the 1999 and 2000 
cohorts (Israel Ministry of Education 2001). Roughly 60 percent of those who took at 
least one Bagrut subject test ended up receiving a Bagrut certificate.  15 
 
The matriculation certificate is a prerequisite for university admission and 
receiving it is one of the most economically important educational milestones. Similar 
high school matriculation exams are found in many countries and in some states in the 
United States. Examples include the French Baccalaureate, the German Certificate of 
Maturity, the Italian Diploma di Maturità, and the New York State Regents examinations. 
Although the Bagrut is an Israeli institution, it can be understood in the American 
vernacular as a “college-bound” indicator. Most of the Israeli students who fail to 
complete a Bagrut still finish their secondary schooling. Nevertheless, postsecondary 
schooling options for high school graduates without a Bagrut are limited
12; very few will 
obtain further schooling. Even institutions that are not otherwise very selective, such as 
teachers’ colleges and two-year professional programs for nursing, optometry, and 
computer programming, favor applicants with a Bagrut certificate. Consistent with this, 
regression evidence from the Israeli census suggests that the economic returns to a Bagrut 
are high. While there is no experimental evidence for the earnings consequences of a 
Bagrut certificate, Abramitzky (2009) shows that having at least a high school diploma 
(which is achieved by completing 12 years of schooling without receiving a Bagrut 
certificate) is associated with 36% higher earnings.
13  
  We note that kibbutz children typically go to regional high schools (mostly 
located outside of kibbutzim), where they are mixed with children from other kibbutzim 
and from villages not based on equality (moshavim).   
 
c. Data  
The empirical analysis is based on a sample that includes high school students 
who live in kibbutzim at the start of 10
th grade, the information on whom is drawn from 
                                                 
12 In the US context, Hoxby (2000) shows that people who invest in education at a more selective college 
earn back their investment several times over during their career. Dale and Krueger (2001) find that 
students who attended more selective colleges do not earn more than other students. However, the average 
tuition charged by the school is significantly related to the students' subsequent earnings. They also find a 
substantial internal rate of return from attending a more costly college and that the payoff to attending an 
elite college appears to be greater for students from more disadvantaged family backgrounds. 
13 In another context, a recent quasi-experimental study of exit exams in Texas suggests that those who pass 
these exams go on to get more postsecondary schooling than they otherwise would have (Francisco 
Martorell, 2005).  
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several administrative data files obtained from the Ministry of Education in Israel. We 
obtained administrative records collected by the Israeli Ministry of Education for six 
consecutive cohorts (from 1995 to 2000) of 10
th grade students. The data are based on 
annual reports submitted by school authorities to the Ministry of Education at the 
beginning of the school year. Each record contains an individual identifier, a school and 
class identifier, and detailed demographic information on the student: date of birth, 
gender, parental education, number of siblings, year of immigration (where relevant), 
ethnicity and, importantly, the student's home address, which allow us to determine who 
lives in a kibbutz.  
We also use the home addresses of students to identify which kibbutz they live in, 
which allows us to link these student-level data with additional data collected by the 
Institute for Research of the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea (Getz 1998-2004) on the 
date at which each kibbutz reformed. We can thus classify students as belonging to 
kibbutzim that reformed early, or kibbutzim that reformed late, and by the degree of their 
kibbutz’s reform. We use 10
th grade to define the base population because it is the first 
year of high school and the last year of compulsory schooling. Therefore, for every 10
th 
grade cohort at the year of the reform or following it, any change in enrollment or 
outcomes should be treated as endogenous. 
We link the students’ files with additional administrative records on schooling 
outcomes. We focus on the following matriculation outcomes that are available for all the 
years: whether the student graduated high school, whether the student received a 
matriculation certificate, whether the student received a matriculation certificate that 
meets university entrance requirements
14, and the average score in the matriculation 
exams. Roughly, 6 percent of the students in the sample did not take the matriculation 
exams. These students get zero values in the average score. The other three matriculation 
outcomes that we use, matriculation status, matriculation status that meets university 
entrance requirements, and the high school completion indicator, do not require such 
imputation; a zero value that students get for these other outcomes is real and not an 
imputed measure of their achievements. We note that these outcomes allow us not only to 
                                                 
14 A matriculation certificate that meets university entrance requirement is one that contains at least 4 
credits in English and another subject at a level of 4 or 5 credits.  17 
 
examine whether students graduated, but also whether they increased their effort during 
high school, as reflected in their exam scores and matriculation status.  
 
IV. Identification Strategy and Estimation  
In order to estimate the causal effect of the pay reform on human capital 
investment, we take advantage of the different timing of the reforms in different 
kibbutzim to construct an appropriate control group.
 We use a difference-in-differences 
approach   comparing educational outcomes of high school students in kibbutzim that 
reformed early (treatment group) vs. late (control group), before and after the early 
reforms (but before the late reforms).
15 Specifically, as our first difference, we compare 
students in kibbutzim that reformed early (1998-2000) as the “treatment group”, with 
students in kibbutzim that reformed late (2003-2004) as the “control group”. As our 
second difference, we compare students who were in high school when the early reform 
started but before the late reform began (10
th grade students in 1999 and 2000), with 
those who were in high school before the early reforms (10
th grade students in 1995 and 
1996). Figure 1 illustrates our identification strategy, and the time line of the early and 
late reforms, and of the affected and unaffected cohorts. In section V.B. we take a more 
continuous treatment approach by exploiting the time-varying “intensity” of the reform. 
The identifying assumption in this strategy is that the exact timing of the reform is 
unrelated to potential outcomes of high school students. This assumption implies that 
older cohorts of early and late reformed kibbutzim should have had similar high school 
outcomes on average. Specifically, since kibbutzim started to reform their pay systems in 
1998, all children who graduated from high school in 1997 or before could not have been 
affected by the reforms because they left high school before the pay reforms began. For 
younger children, the exposure is an increasing function of their date of birth. Hence, the 
effect of the pay reform should be close to 0 for cohorts of children who graduated in 
1998 and increasing for younger cohorts. Therefore, the basic idea behind the 
identification strategy is to compare the difference in high school outcomes between 
potentially affected and unaffected cohorts in a kibbutz that reformed early and the 
                                                 
15 We note that we don’t have data for the post 2000 period. Such data could have allowed us to test 
whether students in kibbutzim that reformed later improved their schooling outcomes once they reformed. 18 
 
respective difference in a kibbutz that reformed late. The difference in these differences 
can be interpreted as the causal effect of the reform, under the assumption that in the 
absence of the reform, the increase in achievements would not have been systematically 
different in students from early- and late-reforming kibbutzim.  
In the next section we provide two related pieces of evidence in support of this 
assumption. First, we show that students in the treatment and control groups are 
practically indistinguishable in terms of their mean background characteristics. Very 
important in this regard is the similarity in the level of education of children’s parents, 
which implies that the students in kibbutzim that reformed early vs. later were similar in 
their academic potential. Similarly, we show that students in the two groups are similar in 
their pre-reform mean schooling outcomes. This evidence implies that the first difference 
is close to zero. Second, we show that the treatment and control kibbutzim were on the 
same time trend of educational matriculation outcomes between 1992 (the first year with 
available Bagrut data) and 1998, when the first wave of reforms started.  
We next discuss the estimation framework. Consider first the difference between 
the mean matriculation outcomes of a young cohort exposed to the reform and that of an 
older cohort not exposed to the reform. If the pay reform led to an increase in high school 
achievements, the difference between young and old cohorts in the affected kibbutzim 
relative to non-affected kibbutzim can be modeled as in the following simple difference-
in-differences regression:  
 
12 () ( ) ikc c k c k ikc Y EarlyReform AffectedCohort EarlyReform α ββ ε =+ + +                         (1) 
 
where Yikc is the achievement outcome of student i in kibbutz k in cohort c,  c α are cohort 
dummies (for students starting high school in 1995, 1996, 1999 and 2000),   
() k EarlyReform  denotes whether the student belonged to a kibbutz that implemented the 
reform early, and ( ) ck AffectedCohort EarlyReform  is the interaction of interest, namely 
whether the student belonged to the affected (young) cohort and lived in a kibbutz that 
reformed early. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the kibbutz level. 19 
 
  In addition to the simple difference-in-differences regressions, we also run 
“controlled” specifications where we include kibbutz fixed effects, cohort fixed effects, 
and a vector of the student’s background characteristics. We therefore estimate the 
following model: 
 
12 () ikc k c c k ikc ikc Y AffectedCohort EarlyReform X γ αβ β ε =++ + +                                      (2)     
 
where  k γ  are kibbutz fixed effects,  ikc X  are student i’s characteristics: gender, father's 
and mother's education, number of siblings, a set of ethnic dummies (originate from 
Africa/Asia, Europe/America, the former Soviet Union (FSU), Ethiopia and other 
countries), and the rest of the variables are as in equation (1). Note that once we include 
kibbutz fixed effects in the model, we have to drop the ( ) k EarlyReform  term. We note 
further that when comparing treated and control students, the kibbutz fixed effects 
essentially also capture school fixed effects because almost all students from the same 
kibbutz attend the same high school. We thus practically not only compare affected and 
unaffected students within the same kibbutz, but also within the same school.  We also 
note that kibbutz fixed effects provide an alternative to kibbutz-level clustering. By 
absorbing the kibbutz-level variation in the outcome variable, they may lead to a gain in 
precision; clustering standard errors makes very little difference. 
  An implication of the identification assumption can be tested because in none of 
the kibbutzim were individuals aged 18 or older in 1999-2000 exposed to the reform. The 
increase in high school matriculation achievements between cohorts in this age group 
should not differ systematically across kibbutzim that adopted the reforms earlier and 
those that adopted them later. We explore this control experiment and contrast the 
outcomes of two pre-reform cohorts, the 10th graders in 1995 and 1996 against the 10th 
graders in 1997. These are the three cohorts that started high school in the three years that 
preceded the first round of the pay reform. For our identification strategy to be 




a. Are the control and treatment groups observationally equivalent? 
In this subsection we test directly whether the students in the treatment and 
control groups are statistically indistinguishable in terms of their observed characteristics. 
To address this issue, we check whether the treatment status (early reformed kibbutzim) 
is correlated with students’ background variables like parental education, family size, and 
proportion of new immigrants. We perform these tests for two pre-reform cohorts (10th 
graders in 1995 and 1996), both separately and jointly, and for the post-treatment cohort 
of 10th graders in 1999 and 2000. For the pre-treatment cohorts we also check whether 
their academic high school matriculation outcomes are similar.  
Table 2 presents the sample of kibbutzim and students by year of reform and by 
cohort. In the period 1998-2000, 74 kibbutzim reformed while 33 reformed in the period 
2003-2004. The sample of students includes the cohorts of 10
th graders in 1995-1996 as 
pre treatment and of 1999-2000 as post treatment. The pre-treatment sample includes 
1,701 students while the post-treatment sample includes 1,648 students. We have also 
experimented with a larger control group by including in it 13 kibbutzim that reformed in 
2005, but the results were unchanged and we therefore do not report them here.  
Panel A of Table 3 provides evidence on the balancing tests and presents the 
mean student characteristics for each cohort by treatment status. In columns 1-3, we 
present the means for the 1995-1996 pre-reform cohorts and in columns 4-6 the means 
for the 1999-2000 post-reform cohorts.
16 The treatment and control sample means for the 
pre-reform and post-reform cohorts are presented in columns 1-2 and columns 4-5 
respectively. The within-cohort treatment-control differences are presented in columns 3 
and 6, using the following balancing regressions: 
 
() ik k ik X EarlyReform u α β =+ +                                                                                      (3a)     
and: 
() ik k ik Y EarlyReform u α β =+ +                                                                                       (3b)     
 
                                                 
16 In Table 3, we used the 1995 and 1996 cohorts together as the pre-treatment baseline but balancing tests 
based on each of these cohorts separately are not different from when pooling them in one sample. 21 
 
where ( ) k EarlyReform  again denotes whether the student belonged to a kibbutz that 
implemented the reform early. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the kibbutz 
level. Below we also discuss comparisons across cohorts within treatment and control 
groups.   
Table 3 shows that student background characteristics are very similar in the 
treatment and control groups, both for pre and post cohorts. For example, focusing first 
on the pre-reform cohorts, we see that levels of parental education are very similar in 
control and treatment, with just over 13 years of schooling for both mother and father. 
The differences in parental education presented in column 3 are -0.292 (s.e. 0.174) for 
mother’s years of schooling and -0.328 (s.e. 0.264) for father’s years of schooling. The 
two respective differences for the post reform cohorts are -0.140 (s.e. 0.229) and -0.523 
(s.e. 0.419). Note that these differences are not statistically different from zero and 
equally importantly they are very small relative to the respective means. The similar 
levels of parental education in the treatment and control groups suggest that students in 
the two groups had similar academic potential, both before and after the pay reform.  
Similarly small and non-significant differences are also seen in all the other 
background characteristics. Out of the 16 estimated differences in background 
characteristics, the only one that is significant (at the 10% level of significance) is the 
difference in proportion of students of European/American ethnic origin in the post-
reform sample. Note this lone significant control-treatment difference is unlikely to 
reflect a consistent pattern because statistically we expect one significant difference at the 
10% level even in the absence of a true difference between the samples, and additionally 
the sign of this difference is positive while the respective difference for the pre-reform 
cohort is negative. We therefore view the results presented in Table 3 as an indication of 
good balancing, meaning that, within cohorts, the treatment and control group are 
indistinguishable in their observables. At the same time, we run specifications as 
described in equation (2), which control for these observable characteristics. 
The above close similarity in background characteristics is also reflected in 
similarly small and insignificant differences in mean outcomes of the control and 
treatment groups in 1995/1996, presented in Panel B of Table 3. Recall that these means 22 
 
are pre-reform outcomes and therefore they imply an equal baseline for both groups. For 
example, the mean high school completion rate in 1995/96 is 95.1% in the treatment 
group and 96.7% in the control group, and the difference between the two is 1.6 
percentage points and not statistically different from zero (s.e. 1.1%). The mean Bagrut 
(Israeli matriculation exam) completion rates are 54.9 and 56.9 and in the control group 
and treatment group, respectively, and the small difference (2.0) is again not significant 
(s.e. 3.6). A similar pattern exists for the other outcomes. These unconditional simple 
mean differences being close to zero is a good indication of a compelling natural 
experiment.   
Table 3 also allows us to compare the cohorts within the control and treatment 
groups over time. The most notable change is in parental schooling, which is higher for 
the 1999/2000 cohort. For example, mean father’s years of schooling increased in the 
control group from 13.6 in 1995/1996 to 14.1 in 1999/2000. Similarly, mother’s years of 
schooling in the control group increased by about 0.4, from 13.7 percent to 14.1 percent. 
However, the treatment-control differences remain balanced because equal changes 
occurred in both groups. It is also worth noting that the magnitude of the changes is small 
relative to the magnitude of the independent variable. In any case, in the outcome 
regressions we include specifications that control for the student background covariates 
(to allow a reduction in the variance of the error term), and we also include kibbutz fixed 
effects.  
 
b. Did the control and treatment kibbutzim experience different exit rates? 
We note that exit is not necessarily a threat for identification, even if the reform 
changed the probability of exit from the kibbutz. To see this, recall that post reform (in a 
fully reformed kibbutz) the return to schooling facing a kibbutz member is the same (8%) 
regardless of whether the student plans to stay or leave (because returns inside and 
outside the kibbutz become the same). Thus, even if the reform changed the probability 
that a student will exit the kibbutz in the future, this will not bias the coefficients because 
the change in return to schooling is the same regardless of whether the student is more or 
less likely to exit post reform.    23 
 
At the same time, high exit rates during high school that are differential between 
treatment and control kibbutzim could be a threat to identification if, for example, 
students who leave suffer academically because they need to adjust to their new high 
school, or if their parents moved to allow them to attend a different school. We address 
this concern by checking whether the likelihood that a student leaves a kibbutz (by 
moving to a non-kibbutz community) is associated with the timing of the reform in his 
kibbutz. We identify students who exit using changes in their home address over time. 
We define a student as exiting if he lived in his kibbutz at the start of the 10
th grade and 
lived outside it at the end of the 12
th grade.  ik E  is therefore an indicator that is equal to 1 
if a student left the kibbutz before completing 12
th grade, and zero otherwise, and we use 
it as the dependent variable in following balancing equation: 
 
() ik k ik E EarlyReform u α β =+ +                                                                                        (4)     
 
We estimate this equation for three different samples, two pre-treatment (1995-96 and 
1997-98) and one post treatment sample (1999-2000). Standard errors are clustered at the 
kibbutz level. 
Table 4 shows that the likelihood that a student leaves his kibbutz is relatively low 
and unrelated to the implementation of the pay reform. The exit rate from kibbutzim of 
the cohort of 10
th graders in 1994/5-95/6 was 4.2 percent in the control group and 5.6 
percent in the treatment group. The difference between these two rates is 0.015 (s.e. 
0.016). We note that the same patterns remain for the post-reform cohort of 10
th graders 
in 1999-2000: the respective exit rates were 3.8 and 5.2 percent and the difference is 
0.014 (s.e. 0.011). Clearly, the difference in the differences is zero. Exit rates also 
remained the same over time in both the treatment and control groups. In the control 
group the exit rates declined from 4.2 in 1995-1996 to 3.8 in 1999-2000, practically no 
change. In the treatment group the exit rates declined from 5.6 in the pre-reform periods 
to 5.2 in 1999-2000 post reform years. These results show that the small and insignificant 
control-treatment differences within each period were paralleled by constancy in the exit 
rate in each of the two groups. The similarity in exit rates between treatment and control 24 
 
groups and over time within these groups suggests no association between the timing of 
the reform and the level and changes in the exit rates from early- and late-reforming 
kibbutzim. This suggests that the likelihood that a student leaves his/her kibbutz is 
unrelated to the implementation of the pay reform.
17  
The fact that exit among families in this age range is low (see Abramitzky 2008) 
is not surprising (see Abramitzky 2008) but it is reassuring for the research design. We 
tested whether there were systematic treatment-control differences in exit rates by 
parental education, and find (results not shown) no evidence for such differences. As in 
Abramitzky (2009), we also find that high-educated parents are more likely to leave than 
low-education parents, but there are no treatment-control differences in this pattern and 
exit rates for both groups are relatively small. We also find no evidence for parents 
switching their children to different schools in response to the reform. 
 
c. Did the control and treatment kibbutzim experience different pre-reform time 
trends? 
We use pre-reform data on the kibbutz mean matriculation rate and Bagrut mean 
test score (two representative outcomes; the evidence for the other outcomes is identical) 
from 1993 to 1998 to estimate differential time trends for treatment and control 
kibbutzim. The unit of observation in this analysis is a kibbutz-year. We employ two 
methods for this estimation. First, we estimate the following constant linear time trend 
model while allowing for an interaction of the constant linear trend with the treatment 
indicator: 
 
12 () kc k k kc Y c c EarlyReform γ ββ ν =+ + × +                                                                        (5)     
 
where c is the cohort (year the student started high school) so that  1 β  measures the 
constant linear time trend and  2 β  measures the mean treatment-control difference in this 
                                                 
17 We note that students who exit are still included in the sample because excluding them would imply a 
sample selection criterion based on an endogenous variable. We also compared the family characteristics 
(parental education, family size and ethnic origin) of kibbutz leavers in our sample and found that they are 
not different in treatment and control kibbutzim. These results are available from the authors. 
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time trend. We also include specifications with the main effect for the treatment group 
(the indicator of early reform) instead of kibbutz fixed effects. Second, we estimate a 
model where we replace the linear time trend variable with a series of year dummies and 
include in the regression an interaction of each of these cohort dummies with the 
treatment indicator. Specifically, we estimate the following equation: 
 
() kc k c c k kc Y EarlyReform γ αβ ν =++ +                                                                              (6)  
 
For each cohort c,  c β  measures the mean treatment-control difference in the outcome. 
The estimates from both models suggest that there is a time trend in the educational 
outcomes used, but this trend is identical for treatment and control kibbutzim. These 
results are presented in Table 5. Panel A presents the estimates of the linear trend model. 
The mean trend is an annual increase of 0.025 in the matriculation rate and a 1.225 points 
annual increase in test scores. The estimated coefficient on the interaction of this trend 
with the treatment indicator is practically zero in both cases. Moreover, the estimated 
coefficient of the treatment indicator main effect is zero in both cases, again confirming 
the balancing tests’ results on pre-reform outcomes presented in Table 3.  
Panel B presents the estimates of the year dummies model. The evidence 
presented in panel B is fully consistent with the linear trend model. The interaction terms 
of the treatment indicator with the year dummies are all small and not significantly 
different from zero; we also note that some are positive and others are negative, lacking 
any consistent pattern. This conclusion is supported by the fact that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that all the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. These F tests are 
reported in the bottom row of the table for the regressions reported in column 2 and 
column 4.  We are therefore confident that there were no pre-1998 existing differential 
time trends in early- and late-reforming kibbutzim that could confound the estimated 





V. The Effect of the Reform on Educational Outcomes  
a. Basic Results 
Panel A of Table 6 reports simple mean outcome differences between treatment 
and control for pre-reform (unaffected) cohorts (1995-1996) and for post-reform 
(affected) cohorts (1999-2000) of 10
th graders. These results are presented in the first two 
rows of the table while in the third row we present simple difference in differences 
estimates with no additional controls. In the fourth row we present the difference in 
differences estimates which are based on regressions that also include individual 
characteristics and kibbutz fixed effects. Each cell in the table shows the estimated 
coefficient on the affected cohort in treated kibbutzim.  
Table 6 shows a positive coefficient of interest for all schooling outcomes. That 
is, relative to control kibbutzim, there was a larger improvement in schooling outcomes 
following the reform in treated kibbutzim. Two things are worth noting before we discuss 
the results further. First, the pay reform increased the high school completion rate, despite 
the fact that this rate was already over 95 percent for the pre-reform cohorts in the 
sample, implying limited scope for improvement. The estimated treatment effect on the 
high school completion rate is 0.033, amounting to a 3 percent improvement. Second, the 
simple and controlled difference in differences estimates of this treatment effect are 
similar, which is a result of the near perfect balancing between treatment and control in 
observables characteristics and in pre-reform outcomes.  
Turning to the estimated treatment effect on the other outcomes, the mean exam 
score is up by 3.55 points relative a pre-treatment mean of 70.6, or 0.17  standard 
deviations of the test score distribution. The matriculation rate is up by 4.9 percentage 
points and the university qualified Bagrut rate is up by 6 percentage points, which 
amounts to almost 12 percent of the pre-reform university qualified Bagrut rate in the 
control group. The improvement in the university qualified Bagrut rate could be driven 
by two particular improvements. The first is an increase in the proportion of students who 
enroll in and pass the English matriculation program at more than a basic level. The 
second is an increase in the proportion of students who pass the matriculation program in 
at least one advanced placement subject. These two criteria are an admission requirement 27 
 
for all universities and most colleges Israel. The improvement we observe likely reflects a 
higher intention to enroll in post secondary schooling.   
  An implication of the identification assumption that the exact timing of the reform 
was unrelated to students’ potential outcomes can be tested. Specifically, individuals aged 
18 or older in 1998 were not exposed to the program. The increase in high school 
matriculation achievements between cohorts in this age group should thus not differ 
systematically across kibbutzim that adopted the reforms earlier and those that adopted 
them later. In Panel B of Table 6, we present this control experiment. We contrast the 
outcomes of two pre- reform cohorts, the 10th graders in 1995-1996 and the 10th graders 
in 1997-1998. These placebo estimated difference in differences are very different from 
the treatment estimates presented in Panel A of Table 6, and they are very close to zero. 
For example, the placebo estimate of the effect on average Bagrut score is 0.304 (s.e. 
1.544) and the estimates on the two Bagrut diploma outcomes are actually negative, 
though not significantly different from zero. We also conduct a placebo test contrasting 
the outcomes of the 10
th graders in 1995 against the 10
th graders in 1996 and find similar 
results, i.e. no effect; results are available from the authors. These results provide 
additional suggestive evidence that the difference in differences estimates based on 
comparing the before and after cohorts are not driven by inappropriate identification 
assumptions. 
 
b. Allowing for differential effect by “intensity” of reform 
The pay reform was not identical across kibbutzim, as some reformed to a greater 
degree than others. Specifically, some kibbutzim introduced a full pay reform and moved 
to a “safety net” model that reflected market forces (and only a small additional safety net 
to low-earners). Other kibbutzim introduced only a partial pay reform and moved to a 
“combined” model (meshulav) that was still based on market forces, but combined them 
with a more progressive tax and wider safety net for members.
18 However, many 
kibbutzim that initially introduced a partial reform eventually implemented a full 
differential pay reform 
                                                 
18 Specifically, under the partial safety net model, a member got to keep a fraction of his earnings above a 
certain level and the rest of his earnings were shared equally among members. 28 
 
In this section we take advantage of the variation over time in the degree of pay 
reform, which is present because some kibbutzim changed immediately from an equal 
sharing system to a full differential pay system, while others introduced a partial 
differential pay system initially but later changed it to a complete differential pay 
structure.
19 We can exploit these changes to define treatment intensity because some of 
these kibbutzim made the change within the period of treatment.
20 We therefore measure 
intensity of the pay reform by counting the number of years each student’s kibbutz 
operated under a system of full differential pay while he was of high school age. We 
therefore define four treatment groups, ranging from 3 years of full reform to 0 years of 
full reform (3 years of partial reform).
21  
We perform balancing tests similar to those presented in Table 3, and the results 
suggest that the students in these four treatment groups are statistically indistinguishable 
from the students of the control group in their observed characteristics. In Online 
Appendix Tables A2 and A3 we present this evidence for the two cleanest treatment 
groups, namely the first and fourth. The balancing tests presented in Online Appendix 
Table A4 show that these two groups are also very similar to each other in terms of 
observed characteristics. 
We then estimate the following controlled difference in differences model while 
including in the estimated model four treatment groups according to the value of the 
intensity measure: 
 
                                                 
19 We note that no kibbutz moved from a full to partial pay system.  
20 Specifically, of the 37 kibbutzim that reformed in 1998, 17 introduced a full pay reform and 20 a partial 
reform, and of the latter group only 6 changed to a full reform within the treatment period (before 2003). Of 
the 14 kibbutzim that reformed in 1999, 7 introduced a full pay reform and 7 a partial reform; of the latter 
group 6 kibbutzim changed to full reform by 2002. Of the 22 kibbutzim that reformed in 2000, 13 
introduced a full pay reform and 9 a partial reform; of the latter group 4 kibbutzim changed to full reform 
by 2002.   
21 Specifically, the first treatment group includes students whose kibbutzim introduced a partial differential 
pay system initially and changed it only after they graduated from high school (3 years of partial reform); 
the second includes students whose first two years of high school were under partial differential pay system 
and whose last year was under full differential pay system (1 year of full reform); the third group includes 
students who were exposed to two years of a full differential pay system during high school (2 years of full 
reform), and the fourth group includes students who spent their entire high school under a full differential 
pay system (3 years of full reform). The first group account for thirty percent of the treated sample, the 
second 11 percent, the third 20 percent, and the fourth 39 percent. 29 
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where j is treatment intensity as defined above.  j β  are the coefficients of interest on the 
dummy variables indicating whether the student was treated with each of the four 
treatment intensities defined above.  
The group with zero intensity of full pay had the lowest estimated effects, while 
the highest estimated effects are for the group with highest intensity of treatment. These 
results are presented in Table 7. The first panel presents the estimates with four intensity 
levels used as treatment measures. In panel B we use only two treatment groups, students 
exposed throughout high school (three years) to a partial pay reform versus students 
exposed to a full differential pay reform throughout their high school.  Therefore panel B 
is based on a sample that excludes the two other treatment groups. The estimated effects 
of the lowest level of reform intensity on all four outcomes are very small and not 
significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the effect of being under a full 
differential pay system for 2 or 3 years has large and significant effect on all four 
outcomes. For example, the effect of three years in high school under a full differential 
pay system causes an 8.1 percentage point increase in the matriculation rate and 9.4 
percentage point increase in the university qualified matriculation rate.  
The results presented in panel B are very similar to the results in panel A and they 
reveal sharply the differences in estimated treatment effect of the full differential pay 
versus the zero estimated effect of the three years of partial differential pay system. Note 
that the size of the effect of the former is much larger than the average effect we 
presented in Table 6 for all outcomes besides high-school completion. For example, 
consider the treatment effect of the full differential pay system on the university qualified 
matriculation rate. This treatment effect is a 10.3 percentage points increase (up from 
average effect of 6 percentage points) in the university qualified matriculation rate, which 
amounts to a 20 percent increase relative to the counterfactual. The mean exam score is 
up by 4.43, or 0.21 standard deviations of the test score distribution. 
Overall, the evidence reported in Table 7 suggests the magnitude of the treatment 
effect increases with years of exposure to a system of full differential pay. Especially 30 
 
important is the much larger estimated effect of treatment based on three years of 
exposure relative to the effect of only one year of exposure, because it is based on a 
comparison of the same type of treatment but with different “intensities”.  
     
c. Allowing for Heterogeneous Effects  
i. Heterogeneous effect by social background 
First, we look at whether the pay reform, full or partial, affected students with 
different social backgrounds differently. On the one hand, assuming a utility that is 
concave in income, we expect students from lower social classes to be more affected by 
the decrease in the income tax because a future dollar increase in earnings is more 
valuable for them. Moreover, we expect students from lower social backgrounds to be 
more affected by the change in return if they are less likely to have inherent motivation to 
invest in schooling and will only do so when given external incentives On the other hand, 
students whose parents are more educated might receive more help at home or elsewhere, 
thus be in a better position to improve their schooling when given the incentives. We 
stratify the sample by parental schooling, splitting the sample into two groups as follows: 
students whose mothers have 13 or more years of schooling (50% percent of students) 
and the rest. Similarly, we stratify the sample by the father’s years of schooling and find 
similar results.
22  
The heterogeneous estimates by parental schooling presented in Panels A and B 
of Table 8 suggest that almost all the mean effects are coming from the sample of 
students for whom parents’ schooling is below the median. Therefore these estimated 
treatment effects for these students are much larger than the basic results presented in 
Table 6, and their percentage increases are also larger because their counterfactual means 
are much lower than the mean of the overall sample (the means of all outcomes for each 
sub-group are presented in Table 8 in curly brackets, below the reported standard errors 
of each parameter). Based on partitioning the sample by mother’s schooling, the 
                                                 
22 We also ran balancing tests like those reported in Table 3 for these sub-samples. The results (available 
from the authors) suggest that the treated and the respective control group have very similar characteristics, 
regardless of whether we stratify the sample by father’s or by mother’s schooling. The balancing tests of 
mean outcomes of pre-treatment cohorts show also close similarity between treatment and control except 
for marginally significant differences in two of the four outcomes when we stratify the sample by mother's 
schooling.  31 
 
estimated effect on high school completion is 0.049 (s.e. 0.024) for the students from low 
education families and 0.014 (s.e. 0.019) for pupils from high education families.
23 The 
two respective difference in differences estimates are 6.175 (s.e. 2.553) and 0.329 (s.e. 
2.114) for the average score, 0.116 (s.e. 0.053) and -0.031 (s.e. 0.047) for the Bagrut rate, 
and 0.100 (s.e. 0.053) and 0.002 (s.e. 0.048) for the university qualified Bagrut rate. The 
effect is larger in the low education sample. For example, the effect of the pay reform on 
the university qualified matriculation rate is a 21 percent increase (0.100/0.478), twice the 
effect estimated for the whole sample. 
The results stratified by father’s schooling are very similar and the implied 
percentage increases in the low education group are again large, except for the effect on 
high school completion, which in this case does not differ between the two groups. 
Specifically, the estimated effect on high school completion is 0.033 (s.e. 0.027) for the 
students from low education families and 0.031 (s.e. 0.017) for pupils from high 
education families. Overall, as can be seen in the top panels of Table 8, the estimates of 
the effect on the other outcomes are large and significant for the low education families 
but small and insignificant for students from high education families.   
We next allow for heterogeneity of the effect by both parental education and 
intensity of reform simultaneously. Consistent with the evidence presented in this section 
and the previous one, Table 9 suggests that the treatment effect is the largest for students 
who were exposed to a full differential pay system throughout their high schools and 
whose parents have lower levels of education. The treatment effect of the full differential 
pay system for students from lower social backgrounds is a 4.4 percentage point increase 
in high school completion rates, an 8.3 point increase in mean exam score, a 19.6 
percentage point increase in the matriculation rate, and a 16.8 percentage point increase 
in the university qualified matriculation rate. The gains in the matriculation rate represent 
a more than 30 percent improvement relative to the mean of the control group. In 
contrast, the intensity of the reform did not matter for students from high educational 
backgrounds. 
                                                 
23 We note that this higher effect on high school completion likely also reflect the “ceiling effect” on this 
outcome. That is, high school completions was already very high pre-treatment (95%) suggesting a very 
limited role for improvement. Because students from low education families had a somewhat lower pre-
treatment high school completion rate, the treatment had more scope to improve their outcomes.   32 
 
As we already mentioned, these results by parents’ education level are the 
opposite of Jensen’s (2010). Conceptually, students from stronger backgrounds could be 
less responsive to changes in incentives if they are inherently more motivated to acquire 
education even in the absence of incentives. At the same time, such students are in a 
better position to improve their schooling outcomes if their parents are less financially 
constrained. We note that the less educated parents in the kibbutz are on average more 
educated than the more educated parents in the Dominican Republic, meaning that 
financial constraints are less important in our context. Therefore, the difference we find 
between students with different educational backgrounds more likely reflects inherent 
differences in responsiveness to the change in the returns to schooling caused by the 
reforms.
24  
Another possibility for why we find little effect for students from high social 
background is that pre reform high-ability members invested more in education because 
there was low opportunity cost in terms of forgone earnings, and they preferred to be in 
school or university than to be working in an unskilled job. We note that a low 
opportunity cost is an inherent feature of high income tax rates. The reform increased the 
opportunity cost of schooling, which might have offset the increased incentives for 
schooling. We also note that this finding that students whose parents are less educated 
respond more rules out a possible income effect, whereby we would expect more 
educated people who gained from the reform to respond more because they could invest 
more in their children’s education. 
 
ii. Heterogeneous effect by gender 
Next we allow for heterogeneity by gender. Male and female students have been 
shown to respond differently to incentives (e.g. Schultz 2004, Angrist and Lavy 2009), 
with females typically being more responsive. However, our estimates stratified by 
gender, presented in Panel C of Table 8 suggest a stronger effect on males than on 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, it could be that students from weaker backgrounds in our context were more affected by 
the reform because their parents experienced a decline in earnings. Another alternative could be that the 
more educated parents reduced their time inputs in their children’s education, because their value of time 
increased sharply following the reform; this could have offset the positive effect of the pay reform. On the 
other hand, educated families after the reform have higher incomes and they could now potentially afford 
additional supplementary inputs (e.g. a private tutor) for their children’s schooling. 33 
 
females, although the standard errors of the estimates are not precise enough to reject no 
gender differences. The estimated effect on high school completion is 0.052 (s.e. 0.023) 
for males and 0.011 (s.e. 0.019) for females, almost significantly different from each 
other. The two respective estimates for the average test scores are 4.820 and 2.549; 
similar relative gaps are evident for the two Bagrut diploma related outcomes.  
Similarly, Table 10 suggests that the treatment effect is not only larger for 
students who were exposed to a full differential pay system throughout their high schools, 
but it is the largest for boys who were fully exposed. The treatment effect of the full 
differential pay system for boys is a 4.2 percentage point increase (0.8 percentage points 
for girls) in high school completion rates, a 6.0 point increase (2.8 for girls) in mean 
exam score, a 10 percentage point increase (3.5 for girls) in the matriculation rate, and a 
9.6 percentage point increase (4.8 for girls) in the university qualified matriculation rate. 
Our findings that boys are more affected by the pay reform, in particular in the 
school completion outcome, stand in contrast to Schultz (2004), who found that girls’ 
school completion responded more to the incentives introduced by Progresa in Mexico. 
Our findings are also different from Angrist and Lavy (2009), who found that girls’ 
Bagrut diploma attainment was affected by conditional bonus payments, whereas boys 
did not react to this monetary incentive. In these papers, girls responded more to an 
increase in incentives designed to directly increase educational outcomes. In our context, 
the pay reform does not increase such short run incentives to perform better in school. In 
contrast, the pay reform we study operates through affecting the future rewards in the 
labor market. It is possible that females perceive a lower return to education in the labor 
market, expect to work in lower paying jobs on average, perhaps because they do not 
expect to become the main earner (for example because they plan to play a bigger role in 
raising children). Indeed, in regressions we run using the 1998-2000 Israeli labor force 
surveys and matching occupations to their mean earnings using income surveys, we find 
that females (both in kibbutzim and outside them) are substantially more likely to work in 
lower paying occupations; they sort into occupations and industries that pay around 20% 
less on average (regression results are available from the authors upon request). 
These findings also contribute to our understanding of how the labor supply 
response to taxation differs by gender. While the literature suggests that men respond less 34 
 
to changes in income taxes in terms of hours worked, our findings suggest that they 
respond more in terms of investment in human capital. 
 
VI. Putting the magnitude of the effects into perspective 
To put the magnitude of the effect we find on the matriculation rate into 
perspective, it is useful to compare our estimates with the effects of various forms of high 
school intervention that had the direct objective of raising the matriculation rate and were 
implemented in Israel around the same academic year, 2000-2001.
25 The first is a 
remedial education program that provided individualized instruction to high school 
students in preparation for the matriculation exams (Lavy and Schlosser, 2005). The 
second is a student matriculation awards program that provided monetary bonuses to 
students who earned matriculation certificates (Angrist and Lavy, 2009), the third is a 
teacher-bonus program that paid math, English and Hebrew teachers bonuses on the basis 
of their students’ performance on matriculation exams (Lavy, 2009), and the fourth is a 
school choice program that allowed students in Tel Aviv to freely choose their secondary 
school in 7
th grade (Lavy, 2010).  
  The effect of pay reform we study here was larger than the effect of these other 
programs, except for the remedial program. Specifically, the remedial program produced 
a gain similar to that of the pay reform we study here: an increase of 12 percentage points 
in the matriculation rate of participants in comparison to a gain of 10 percentage points 
caused by a full differential pay reform. Note however, that the remedial program was 
targeted to students with low probability of passing some of the Bagrut exams while the 
pay reform affected students with a much higher Bagrut passing rate. The students’ bonus 
program increased the matriculation rate by 6 percentage points, though the gain was 
mainly among girls. The teacher bonus program increased the matriculation rate by 3.3 
percent, while the school choice program led to a 6.2 percentage point increase in the 
matriculation rate. However, we note that the first three of these interventions involved 
only one year of treatment while the pay reform we study in this paper involved three 
                                                 
25 We note that those interventions were local and did not affect students in our sample. 35 
 
years of treatment. We also note that unlike these alternative programs, the pay reform 
was not an explicit intervention that targeted improvements in matriculation outcomes.  
 
VII. Conclusions and Implications   
In this paper we use a natural experiment to test whether and to what extent 
investment in education is responsive to changes in the redistributive policy that changes 
the returns to education. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study that uses 
non-experimental data with an actual change in the rate of return to schooling to study the 
impact of an increase in the benefit from schooling on human capital investment.  
The natural experiment that we exploit in this study is the reforms instituted by 
many Israeli kibbutzim in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These reforms took many 
kibbutzim from paying all their members the same wage regardless of their human capital 
and the jobs they performed, to paying wages based on the market rate of return to 
schooling. These reforms caused a sharp and salient increase in the returns to education 
for kibbutz members. We rely on this sharp change to test whether and to what extent an  
effective decrease in the income tax rate, which substantially increases the return to 
schooling, induces high school students to invest more in their education, as reflected in 
their academic achievements.  
We use a difference-in-differences approach and take advantage of the fact that 
different kibbutzim reformed at different times for our identification. Specifically, we 
compare educational outcomes of high school students in kibbutzim that reformed early 
(the treatment group) and late (the control group), before and after the early reforms (but 
before the late reforms). The treatment group is nearly identical to the control group in 
observable pre-determined characteristics and pre-reform mean outcomes. We find 
students are indeed responsive to changes in returns to education: when their kibbutzim 
reformed, they considerably improved their educational outcomes such as whether they 
graduated and their average matriculation exam scores. Males reacted more strongly than 
females, and students with less educated parents reacted much more strongly than those 
with more educated parents. Students who spent their entire three years of high school in 
a kibbutz that reformed to a greater extent improved their educational outcomes more. 36 
 
Our findings have implications beyond the Israeli context. First, they shed light on the 
educational responses that could result from a decrease in the income tax rate, thus are 
informative on the long-run labor supply responses to tax changes. Second, they shed 
light on the educational responses expected when the returns to education increase. For 
example, such changes might be occurring in many countries as technology-oriented 
growth increases the return to skills.
26 The transition from a centrally planned to a market 
economy in the former Soviet republics is another important historical episode that 
resulted in an increase in the rate of return to schooling. Brainerd (1998) shows that the 
transition to a market economy has produced a substantial and rapid change in the wage 
structure in Russia, the overall wage inequality nearly doubled from 1991 to 1994 and the 
returns to education have increased considerably. Similar findings are reported by 
Svejnar (1999) for transitional Central and Eastern European economies. While our 
results are silent on the general equilibrium effects that could result from such huge 
economy-wide changes, they shed light on the likely impact these changes had on human 
capital investment in the former Soviet nations. Third, our findings may suggest the likely 
human capital consequences in developing countries that liberalized their labor markets, 
for example Vietnam in the mid 1980’s,
27 and as a result experienced increases in the 
returns to schooling. Finally, our findings may improve our understanding of the large 
human capital gap between first and second generation immigrants in developed 
countries.
28 Our findings suggest that part of the higher education of immigrants’ children 
from some countries could be due to the higher rates of return to schooling they 
experience in their host countries relative to the returns in their home countries.  
                                                 
26 See, for example, the discussion in Autor, Katz and Krueger (1999), Card and Dinardo (2002), and 
Golding and Katz (2008). 
27 See Moock, Patrinos and Venkataraman (1998).    
28 See Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010) and Aydemir and Sweetman (2006). 37 
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reformed (2003-2004)  
year 
Notes: As our first difference, we compare students in kibbutzim that reformed early (1998-2000) as the “treatment 
group”, with students in kibbutzim that reformed late (2003-2004) as the “control group”. As our second 
difference, we compare students who were in high school after the early reforms but before the late reforms (10
th 
grade students in 1999 and 2000), with those who were in high school before the early reform (10
th grade students 
in 1995 and 1996). 
Notes: The figure plots median wages by education of all working members in one particular kibbutz pre and post 
reform Wages are measured in 2010 New Israeli Shekels per month. 1 US dollar is currently equal to 
approximately 3.6 shekels.   
40(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of Schooling .080 .083
(.021) (.021)






Age and Age Squared No Yes No  Yes
Kibbutz Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 197 196 197 196
Notes: This tables presents results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the natural
log of wages, run for members of two reformed kibbutzim. Wages are measured in New Israeli 2010
Shekels per month. 1 US dollar is currently equal to approximately 3.6 shekels. Outliers are members
with wages below 2000 shekels. We exclude them because we suspect they only work part time.Years
of schooling are calculated as 8 for elementary, 12 for high school, 14 for other post-secondary, 15 for
BA, 16 for an engineer, 17 for MA and 20 for PhD.




A. 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996
Kibbutzim 74 33
Students 1,100 601
B. 10th Grade Students in 1999-2000
Kibbutzim 74 33
Students 1,043 605
Table 2: Distribution of Kibbutzim, Schools and Students by Year of 
Reform and by 10th Grade Cohorts
Year of Reform
Notes: This table presents the number of kibbutzim and students in the
treatment and control kibutzim and treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and
untreated (10th grade in 1995-96) cohorts.
42Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.495 0.507 -0.013 0.523 0.536 -0.012
(0.500) (0.500) (0.027) (0.500) (0.499) (0.023)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.26 13.59 -0.328 13.60 14.12 -0.523
(2.776) (2.841) (0.264) (2.525) (2.973) (0.419)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.42 13.71 -0.292 13.94 14.08 -0.140
2.47 2.44 (0.174) 2.23 2.25 (0.229)
Number of Siblings 2.56 2.65 -0.094 2.53 2.77 -0.239
(1.357) (1.358) (0.199) (1.249) (1.581) (0.280)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.105 0.103 0.001 0.091 0.079 0.012
(0.306) (0.304) (0.016) (0.288) (0.270) (0.021)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.346 0.379 -0.033 0.360 0.306 0.054
(0.476) (0.486) (0.035) (0.480) (0.461) (0.033)
Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries 0.016 0.015 0.001 0.013 0.013 0.000
(0.127) (0.122) (0.006) (0.115) (0.114) (0.006)
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.013 0.017 -0.004 0.031 0.023 0.008
(0.112) (0.128) (0.007) (0.173) (0.150) (0.009)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.951 0.967 -0.016 - - -
(0.216) (0.180) (0.011)
Mean Matriculation Score 70.62 72.48 -1.862 - - -
(23.250) (21.039) (1.309)
Matriculation Certification 0.549 0.569 -0.020 - - -
(0.498) (0.496) (0.036)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.516 0.536 -0.019 - - -
(0.500) (0.499) (0.035)
Observations 1,100 601 - 1,043 605 -
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th graders.
Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim from regression equation (3). Standard
errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. Treatment kibbutzim are those that
reformed in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that reformed in 2003-2004. 
Table 3: Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim 
10th Grade Students 
in 1999 and 2000
10th Grade Students
 in 1995 and 1996
43Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3)
10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 0.056 0.042 0.015
(0.231) (0.200) (0.016)
10th Grade Students in 1999-2000 0.052 0.038 0.014
(0.222) (0.191) (0.011)
Difference -0.005 -0.004 -
(0.010) (0.016)
Table 4: Treatment-Control and Between-Cohort Differences in Students' Exit Rates From 
Their Kibbutzim
Notes: This table presents exit rates from their kibbutzim of three cohorts of students in treatment
and control kibbutzim. Columns 1 and 2 show means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of
exit rates for the different groups of students. Column 3 shows differences between the groups
and standard errors of the differences clustered at the kibbutz level (in parentheses), estimated
from equation (4) in the text. Exit is defined as living in the kibbutz at the start of 10th grade, and
living outside the kibbutz by the end of 12th grade. Treatment kibbutzim are those that reformed
in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that reformed in 2003-2004. 
44(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Linear Trend Model
Time Trend 0.025 0.026 1.225 1.287
(0.011) (0.010) (0.478) (0.451)
Treatment x Time Trend -0.008 -0.006 -0.267 -0.361
(0.013) (0.012) (0.580) (0.547)
Treatment 0.005 - 0.681 -
(0.050) (2.270)
B. Cohort Dummies Model
Treatment x 1994 -0.022 -0.005 2.178 2.329
(0.076) (0.070) (3.481) (3.295)
Treatment x 1995 -0.011 0.003 -1.716 -1.782
(0.075) (0.070) (3.446) (3.255)
Treatment x 1996 -0.030 -0.008 0.403 0.024
(0.075) (0.070) (3.446) (3.255)
Treatment x 1997 0.036 0.051 1.765 0.816
(0.075) (0.070) (3.449) (3.259)
Treatment x 1998 -0.087 -0.074 -2.019 -1.962
(0.075) (0.069) (3.416) (3.221)
Treatment -0.002 - -0.358 -
(2.424)
Kibbutz Fixed-Effects NO YES NO YES
                         F(  5,   488) =    0.66                              F(  5,   488) =    0.48
                         Prob > F =    0.6516                              Prob > F =    0.7897
Table 5: Treatment-Control Differences in Pre-Reform Time Trends in Schooling Outcomes, 
10th Grade Students in 1993-1998
Matriculation Certification Mean Matriculation Score
Notes: This table presents the results from OLS regressions run at the kibbutz level predicting the
proportion of students who received matriculation certificates (columns 1 and 2) or the mean scores in
the matriculation exams (columns 3 and 4) for the cohorts of 10th graders from 1993 to 1998 (pre
reform). In the regressions in Panel A, outcomes are allowed to vary according to a linear time (cohort)
trend that differs in treatment and control kibbutzim, as described in regression equation (5). In the
regressions in Panel B, the difference between treatment and control kibbutzim is allowed to vary
freely for each cohort of students. Cohort dummies are included in the Panel B regressions but their
coefficients are not reported. Estimates in columns 2 and 4 include kibbutz fixed effects. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses. The number of observarions in each regression is 605. The F
statistics at the bottom of the table test whether all the interaction terms in Panel B between treatment











(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Experiment of Interest, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000
Cross-Section Regressions
Treatment-Control Difference, 1995-1996 -0.015 -1.554 -0.010 -0.008
(0.010) (1.091) (0.025) (0.025)
Treatment-Control Difference, 1999-2000 0.020 2.200 0.032 0.041
(0.011) (1.187) (0.024) (0.025)
Difference in Differences Regressions
Simple Difference in Differences 0.033 3.112 0.029 0.040
(0.016) (1.517) (0.035) (0.035)
Controlled Difference in Differences 0.033 3.546 0.049 0.060
(0.015) (1.604) (0.035) (0.035)
B. Control Experiment, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1997-1998 
Difference in Differences Regressions
Simple Difference in Differences 0.011 0.213 -0.016 -0.025
(0.015) (1.527) (0.036) (0.036)
Controlled Difference in Differences 0.011 0.304 -0.013 -0.027
(0.015) (1.544) (0.035) (0.035)
Table 6: Cross-Section Treatment-Control Differences and Difference in Differences Estimates 
Notes: The first half of Panel A presents the coefficients of interest in single difference regressions comparing
outcomes of students of the same cohort between treatment kibbutzim (reformed in 1998-2000) and control
kibbutzim (reformed in 2003-04). The dependent variable in column 1 is whether the student completed high
school; in column 2 it is her mean score in the matriculation exams; in column 3 it is whether she received a
matriculation certificate; in column 4 it is whether she received a matriculation certificate that satisfies the
requirements for university study. 
The second half of Panel A presents the coefficients of interest in difference-in-differences regressions comparing
students in treatment and control kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in
1995-96). The single difference and simple difference-in-differences regressions include cohort dummies and
standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the kibbutz level. The controlled difference-in-differences estimation
(equation (2) in the text) include cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender,
father's and mother's education, number of siblings, a set of ethnic dummies (origin from Africa/Asia,
Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and other countries). Panel B presents difference-in-differences
regressions parallel to those in Panel A, but that compare two untreated cohorts. For the controlled difference-in-











(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Intensity of Exposure
Three Years of Full Reform 0.029 4.288 0.082 0.100
(N=405) (0.019) (2.055) (0.043) (0.043)
Two Years of Full Reform 0.054 5.621 0.031 0.083
(N=211) (0.018) (1.925) (0.047) (0.047)
One Year of Full Reform 0.053 3.744 0.009 -0.020
(N=114) (0.024) (2.485) (0.058) (0.059)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.016 1.239 0.036 0.025
(N=313) (0.020) (2.202) (0.045) (0.045)
B. Intensity of Exposure: partial versus full
Three Years of Full Reform 0.030 4.431 0.084 0.103
(N=405) (0.019) (2.064) (0.043) (0.043)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.015 1.285 0.035 0.026
(N=313) (0.021) (2.219) (0.046) (0.046)
Table 7: Controlled Difference in Differences Estimates by Level of Intensity of Exposure to Full Differential Pay
Notes: This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-
2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-
96), where the treatment effect varies by the number of years the student spent in high school under a full relative to partial
differential pay system (versions of equation (7) in the text). The value of N for each intensity of treatment is the number of
students who faced that intensity of treatment. The Panel A regressions interact dummies for the number of years each treated
student spent in high school under a full differential pay system with the treatment cohort dummy.  
Panel B regressions duplicate panel A regressions, but omit students who spent some high school years under a partial
differential pay system and some under a full. In each case, estimation includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the
demographic controls gender, father's and mother's education, number of siblings, a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia,











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experiment of Interest, 10th Grade Students in 1995-1996 and 1999-2000
A. Sample Stratification By Mother's Education
Low 0.049 6.175 0.116 0.100
(0.024) (2.553) (0.053) (0.053)
{0.947} {69.03} {0.517} {0.478}
High 0.014 0.329 -0.031 0.002
(0.019) (2.114) (0.047) (0.048)
{0.965} {74.82} {0.660} {0.625}
B. Sample Stratification By Father's Education
Low 0.033 5.879 0.093 0.086
(0.027) (2.781) (0.055) (0.055)
{0.943} {68.10} {0.490} {0.447}
High 0.031 1.701 0.010 0.034
(0.017) (1.924) (0.046) (0.047)
{0.968} {75.43} {0.679} {0.646}
C. Sample Stratification By Gender
Male 0.052 4.820 0.060 0.056
(0.023) (2.505) (0.051) (0.051)
{0.947} {69.18} {0.535} {0.490}
Female 0.011 2.549 0.027 0.034
(0.019) (2.037) (0.049) (0.049)
{0.966} {75.16} {0.654} {0.625}
Table 8: Controlled Differences in Differences Estimates in Sub-Samples by Gender and Parental Education
Notes: This table presents the coefficientsof interest in difference-in-differencesregressions(equation (2) in the text)
comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated
(10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-96), stratified by background characteristics. The
dependent variable in column 1 is whether the student completed high school; in column 2 it is her mean score in the
matriculation exams; in column 3 it is whether she received a matriculation certificate; in column 4 it is whether she
received a matriculation certificate that satisfies the requirements for university study. All regressions include cohort
dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, father's and mother's education, number of
siblings, a set of ethnic dummies (origin from Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and
other countries). Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. The means of all outcomes for each sub-group











(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Sample Stratification by Mother's Education
Low
Three Years of Full Reform 0.044 8.255 0.196 0.168
(0.033) (3.421) (0.067) (0.068)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.026 2.792 0.109 0.085
(0.033) (3.612) (0.069) (0.069)
{0.943} {68.64} {0.515} {0.476}
High
Three Years of Full Reform 0.008 -0.011 -0.034 0.023
(0.024) (2.624) (0.058) (0.059)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.006 -0.246 -0.047 -0.036
(0.027) (2.899) (0.063) (0.064)
{0.964} {74.57} {0.656} {0.619}
B. Sample Stratification by Father's Education
Low
Three Years of Full Reform 0.027 9.547 0.205 0.190
(0.035) (3.591) (0.069) (0.069)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.025 0.996 -0.015 -0.035
(0.036) (3.990) (0.072) (0.071)
{0.940} {67.69} {0.484} {0.440}
High
Three Years of Full Reform 0.026 -0.207 -0.006 0.035
(0.024) (2.508) (0.057) (0.058)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.016 2.964 0.091 0.096
(0.024) (2.576) (0.061) (0.062)
{0.965} {75.19} {0.678} {0.645}
Table 9: Controlled Difference in Differences Estimates by Level of Intensity of Exposure to Full Differential Pay, Sub-
Samples by Parental Education
Notes: This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-2000)
and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-96), where
the treatment effect varies by the number of years the student spent in high school under a full relative to partial differential pay
system (versions of equation (7) in the text), stratified by mother's (Panel A) or father's (Panel B) education. The regressions omit
students who spent some high school years under a partial differential pay system and some under a full. They interact dummies for
the number of years each treated student spent in high school under a full differential pay system with the treatment cohort dummy.  
Estimation includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, father's and mother's education, 
number of siblings, a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and other countries).  
Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. The means of all outcomes for each sub-group are presented in curly brackets 











(1) (2) (3) (4)
Male
Three Years of Full Reform 0.042 6.017 0.097 0.096
(0.030) (3.211) (0.063) (0.063)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.018 1.085 0.028 0.007
(0.034) (3.460) (0.067) (0.067)
{0.944} {68.87} {0.532} {0.485}
Female
Three Years of Full Reform 0.008 2.832 0.035 0.048
(0.026) (2.710) (0.062) (0.063)
Three Years of Partial Reform 0.017 2.201 0.045 0.037
(0.021) (2.702) (0.064) (0.064)
{0.965} {74.83} {0.651} {0.621}
Table 10: Controlled Difference in Differences Estimates by Level of Intensity of Exposure to Full Differential Pay, Sub-
Samples by Gender
Notes: This table presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions comparing students in treatment (reformed 1998-
2000) and control (reformed 2003-04) kibbutzim who are treated (10th grade in 1999-2000) and untreated (10th grade in 1995-
96), where the treatment effect varies by the number of years the student spent in high school under a full relative to partial
differential pay system (versions of equation (7) in the text), stratified by gender. The regressions omit students who spent some
high school years under a partial differential pay system and some under a full. They interact dummies for the number of years
each treated student spent in high school under a full differential pay system with the treatment cohort dummy.  
Estimation includes cohort dummies, kibbutz fixed effects, and the demographic controls gender, father's and mother's
education, number of siblings, a set of origin dummies (Africa/Asia, Europe/America, immigrants from FSU, Ethiopia and other
countries).  Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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51Pre reform
Mean/Median Wage
all no outliers all all no outliers all no outliers
High school or less 44 37 8,661 7,980          9,331          6,929          8,000          
College or other post-secondary 36 31 8,661 8,592          9,853          7,695          9,000          
MA 20 19 8,661 10,060        10,536        9,750          10,500        
PhD 2 2 8,661 10,881        10,881        10,881        10,881        
Table A1: Wage by Education of All Working Members in One Particular Kibbutz Pre and Post Reform
Notes: Wages are measured in New Israeli 2010 Shekels per month. 1 US dollar is currently equal to approximately 3.6 shekels. Outliers are members with wages
below 2000 shekels. We exclude them because we suspect they only work part time.
Median Wage Mean Wage Number of obs
Post reform
52Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.475 0.507 -0.032 0.528 0.536 -0.008
(0.500) (0.500) (0.033) (0.500) (0.499) (0.031)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.24 13.59 -0.350 13.54 14.12 -0.583
(2.938) (2.841) (0.280) (2.547) (2.973) (0.430)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.52 13.71 -0.189 14.04 14.08 -0.046
2.34 2.44 (0.217) 2.21 2.25 (0.245)
Number of Siblings 2.60 2.65 -0.046 2.56 2.77 -0.214
(1.409) (1.358) (0.231) (1.332) (1.581) (0.310)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.098 0.103 -0.005 0.081 0.079 0.001
(0.298) (0.304) (0.020) (0.272) (0.270) (0.022)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.359 0.379 -0.020 0.369 0.306 0.063
(0.480) (0.486) (0.043) (0.483) (0.461) (0.040)
Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries 0.020 0.015 0.005 0.013 0.013 -0.001
(0.140) (0.122) (0.008) (0.112) (0.114) (0.007)
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.016 0.017 -0.001 0.032 0.023 0.009
(0.124) (0.128) (0.009) (0.176) (0.150) (0.012)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.949 0.967 -0.018 - - -
(0.221) (0.180) (0.015)
Mean Matriculation Score 71.40 72.48 -1.075 - - -
(21.876) (21.039) (1.573)
Matriculation Certification 0.576 0.569 0.007 - - -
(0.495) (0.496) (0.045)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.538 0.536 0.002 - - -
(0.499) (0.499) (0.044)
Observations 448 601 472 605
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th graders.
Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim from regression equation (3). Standard
errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. Treatment kibbutzim are those that
reformed fully in 1998-2000. Control kibbutzim are those that reformed in 2003-2004. 
Table A2: Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim 
Treatment:1998-2000, Full Reform. Control: 2003-4
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000
53Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.508 0.507 0.000 0.520 0.536 -0.015
(0.500) (0.500) (0.029) (0.500) (0.499) (0.025)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.28 13.59 -0.313 13.65 14.12 -0.473
(2.662) (2.841) (0.286) (2.508) (2.973) (0.429)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.35 13.71 -0.363 13.86 14.08 -0.218
2.56 2.44 (0.186) 2.24 2.25 (0.241)
Number of Siblings 2.52 2.65 -0.128 2.51 2.77 -0.259
(1.320) (1.358) (0.220) (1.176) (1.581) (0.289)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.109 0.103 0.006 0.100 0.079 0.020
(0.312) (0.304) (0.018) (0.300) (0.270) (0.025)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.337 0.379 -0.042 0.352 0.306 0.046
(0.473) (0.486) (0.039) (0.478) (0.461) (0.038)
Immigrants from Non-FSU Countries 0.014 0.015 -0.001 0.014 0.013 0.001
(0.117) (0.122) (0.007) (0.118) (0.114) (0.007)
Immigrants from FSU Countries 0.011 0.017 -0.006 0.030 0.023 0.007
(0.103) (0.128) (0.007) (0.170) (0.150) (0.010)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.952 0.967 -0.014 - - -
(0.213) (0.180) (0.013)
Mean Matriculation Score 70.07 72.48 -2.403 - - -
(24.151) (21.039) (1.497)
Matriculation Certification 0.531 0.569 -0.038 - - -
(0.499) (0.496) (0.038)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.502 0.536 -0.034 - - -
(0.500) (0.499) (0.038)
Observations 652 601 571 605
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th graders.
Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim from regression equation (3). Standard
errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. Treatment kibbutzim are those that
reformed partially in 1998-2000 (and did not reform fully during the treatment period). Control kibbutzim are those that
reformed in 2003-2004. 
Table A3: Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Treatment and Control Kibbutzim 
Treatment:1998-2000, Partial Reform. Control: 2003-4
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000
54Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Student's Characteristics
Male 0.475 0.508 -0.032 0.528 0.520 0.007
(0.500) (0.500) (0.029) (0.500) (0.500) (0.032)
Father's Years of Schooling 13.24 13.28 -0.037 13.54 13.65 -0.110
(2.938) (2.662) (0.208) (2.547) (2.508) (0.185)
Mother's Years of Schooling 13.52 13.35 0.173 14.04 13.86 0.173
2.34 2.56 (0.200) 2.21 2.24 (0.159)
Number of Siblings 2.60 2.52 0.082 2.56 2.51 0.045
(1.409) (1.320) (0.211) (1.332) (1.176) (0.205)
Ethnic Origin: Africa/Asia 0.098 0.109 -0.011 0.081 0.100 -0.019
(0.298) (0.312) (0.021) (0.272) (0.300) (0.023)
Ethnic Origin: Europe/America 0.359 0.337 0.022 0.369 0.352 0.017
(0.480) (0.473) (0.042) (0.483) (0.478) (0.040)
Immigrants from non-FSU countries 0.020 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.014 -0.001
(0.140) (0.117) (0.008) (0.112) (0.118) (0.007)
Immigrants from FSU countries 0.016 0.011 0.005 0.032 0.030 0.002
(0.124) (0.103) (0.007) (0.176) (0.170) (0.013)
B. High School Outcomes
High School Completion 0.949 0.952 -0.004 - - -
(0.221) (0.213) (0.015)
Mean Matriculation Score 71.40 70.07 1.328 - - -
(21.876) (24.151) (1.622)
Matriculation Certification 0.576 0.531 0.045 - - -
(0.495) (0.499) (0.042)
University Qualified Matriculation 0.538 0.502 0.036 - - -
(0.499) (0.500) (0.042)
Observations 448 652 472 571
Notes: Columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 present means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of characteristics and outcomes of
students in treatment and control kibbutzim for affected (1999-2000) and unaffected (1995-1996) cohorts of 10th graders.
Columns 3 and 6 present the differences between treatment and control kibbutzim from regression equation (3). Standard
errors of these differences clustered at the kibbutz level are given in parentheses. Here "fully reformed kibbutzim" refers to
kibbutzim that reformed fully in 1998-2000, and "partially reformed kibbutzim" refers to kibbutzim that reformed partially
in 1998-2000 (and didn't fully reform throughout the treatment period).  
Table A4: Balancing Tests of Students' Characteristics and Outcomes in Fully- and Partially-Reformed Kibbutzim
10th Grade Students 10th Grade Students 
 in 1995 and 1996 in 1999 and 2000
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